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MovIEs, CENSORSHIP AND THE LAw. By Ira H. Carmen. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1966. Pp. x, 339. $7.95.
One of the reasons that the ever-ranging debate about movie
censorship sheds more heat than light is that the debate usually
structures around United States Supreme Court decisions. Like the
top of an iceberg, these decisions are visible, measurable, and,
standing by themselves, not too perilous. It is the down-under part
that counts, however, and this is usually ignored. In this respect,
Mr. Carmen adds some new dimensions to the discussion in his
book, Movies, Censorship and the Law. He can therefore be forgiven
for not digging quite as deeply into the real causes and effects of
motion picture censorship as one might wish. He is at least where
the action really is.
The traditional law review note or article in this field focuses its
attention on the most recent Supreme Court case. It analyzes the
decision and seeks to answer the question of whether the Court has
moved forward or backward from its previous pronouncements on
motion picture censorship. The ambitious author may seek to collate
the cases and strive to line them up as showing a rational evolution
of the current standards of censorship. It continues to surprise the
commentators that a graph of these decisions most closely resembles
the flight of a bumblebee.
Motion picture censorship is a phenomenon in a free society. It
therefore causes phenomenal judicial pronouncements. Is there any
other way to describe the initial movie censorship decision of the
Supreme Court in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission1 of
1915? There the Court said that motion pictures were a business
"pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit." Thus, the
Court separated out movies from the fabric of law covering other
forms of expression such as books or newspapers. Fifty years later
many laugh at that decision, and some even think that today motion
I. 2!16 U.S. 280 (1915).
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pictures have the equal protection afforded other forms of communication. One need only contemplate the reaction to a proposal to
screen all the newspapers or books prior to publication to discard
that notion.
The fact of the matter is that in 1915 the Supreme Court was
looking for an easy way to avoid the impossible task of justifying and
yet limiting the wholly different attitude that the American public
and government have about motion pictures compared to the other
media of communication. The fact of the matter is that even in 1915
the record presented to the Supreme Court showed innumerable
censorship authorities regulating this "pure and simple" business of
motion pictures. The fact of the matter is that the number of censorship authorities has increased even as the United States Supreme
Court has backed away from the simplistic Mutual Film approach
to the problem.
One of the places where Mr. Carmen has failed to dig to the root
is the "why" of this separate treatment for motion pictures as against
the other media of communication. There is a brief discussion in the
conclusion about the inconclusiveness of the proof that the viewing
of motion pictures in fact does lead to antisocial behavior. However,
the author dismisses out of hand the suggestion of the American
Civil Liberties Union and others that, absent such convincing proof,
the first amendment freedom ought to prevail in its entirety as to
motion pictures. Instead Mr. Carmen concludes for enlightened censorship:
It is herewith offered as a considered judgment that under a system
of regulation set out above, the motion picture should be allowed
to take its place as a first-class medium for cultivation of artistic
and intellectual values; and it should never be condemned to the
purgatory of censorship domination.

Why? What is this mysterious essence of motion pictures which
requires that they be treated differently from the printed word, the
spoken word, the still picture? Even television which communicates
via the same senses as motion pictures is free from prior restraints.
What is it about motion pictures which causes such a different attitude toward the freedom to communicate? Even though the question
might have some psychological-mystical connotations, it can hardly
be deemed irrelevant to the subject matter of this book. Until one
knows why regulation is necessary in a particular field of activity, it
is hard to determine what kind of regulation is compatible with our
notions of a free society.
Maybe it is a prejudice against Hollywood-a prejudice that is in
part based on the fact that everybody connected with motion pictures makes so much money out of it. The Supreme Court in 1915
found that a complete answer to the question in the Mutual Film
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case. As late as 1948 one of the great civil libertarians of our time,
Alexander Meiklejohn, was willing to lump radio (which was his pet
peeve), movies, and newspapers into a category that was not "entitled
to the protection of the First Amendment [because they were] not
engaged in a task of enlarging and enriching human communication." Rather they were "engaged in making money. And the first
amendment does not intend to guarantee men freedom to say what
some private interest pays them to say for its own advantage." 2 As
late as last year the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated
Ginzburg case3 seemed to indicate that the measure of money or
money-making motive involved in a communication might affect the
measure of freedom that the communication was to enjoy.
There is more to the mystery than that, however, when it comes
to motion pictures. The abandonment of the Mutual Film rationale
establishes that there is more. Yet the cases do not shed too much
light on the problem, because judges usually are unwilling to describe the visceral reasons that underlie the feeling that there is something unique about motion pictures as a form of communication.
Local censorship authorities are a much better source. In the reviewer's experience with cases before the Chicago censors the reasons
have to do with the darkness of theaters, the fact that both sexes see
a motion picture together, and the fact that the motion picture is
"larger than life."
If these reasons are valid, then the system of regulation perhaps
ought to take them into account. How about a regulatory scheme
which says that certain kinds of motion pictures can be shown only
in well-lighted theaters? How about a scheme which precludes bisexual audiences? If this sounds silly, then contemplate the fact that
the motion picture "Never on Sunday" was completely banned by
some censorship authorities, limited to "adults only" audiences by
others, screened in advance throughout the country, but just recently
was shmvn to television audiences throughout the country without
any such limitations or prior reviewing.
A separate segment of the mystery is also treated somewhat
cavalierly by the author. This has to do with the notion that motion
pictures must be previously restrained. Our basic law precludes anticipatory restraint of all kinds of behavior that has antisocietal consequences, ranging from the commission of a crime to the ·writing of
a book. The exhibition of motion pictures, however, may be subject
to prior restraint. The author, although acknowledging the difficulties inherent in prior censorship (and his own personal distaste for
such a system) made no inquiry as to why there was this strong
impetus for reviewing motion pictures, and only motion pictures,
2. A. ME!KLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 104 (1948).
3. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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in advance of their exhibition. Indeed in discussing Burstyn v. Wilson,4' which supposedly brought motion pictures to a constitutional
parity with other forms of communication, the author saw little significance in the Court's ambiguous treatment of prior restraint as
an exception to such parity. 5
Some of the most useful material in the book appears in the
appendices containing interviews with various censorship authorities.
First of all, it is good reading (the Chicago authorities vigorously
deny the charge that the censor board is made up of "policemen's
widows" and point out that two of the censors are aldermen's
widows). Secondly, the interviews point up some dismaying notions
about freedom of communication in general. Thus, one of the interviewees affirmed the desirability of prior restraints as against subsequent punishment by saying: "It is better to have a board. You have
centralized control. Under the other system everyone is a censor."
Another complained that the courts were "bending over backwards
to favor freedom of speech considerations." Another stated: "It is
important to remember that movies are made only for financial
profit and not for educational or artistic reasons."
Most important, the appendices confirm the contention that the
courts propose and the censorship authorities dispose. Many of the
censorship authorities operate without lawyers; almost all say they
operate on a case-by-case basis with little if any attention being paid
to the fine legal niceties so agonizingly constructed by the courts and
analyzed by the legal commentators.
The author uses the appendices as well as other field research to
good avail in the text. It is the grist out of which the practice of
censorship is juxtaposed against the law of censorship. As said before,
this is the unique contribution that makes the book well worth
reading.
One other sin of omission ought to be noted. Anyone who has
read the literature of censorship cases is struck by the fact that many
of the decisions which were heralded as major break-throughs in
favor of freedom really only involved word changes. Thus "obscene"
became "lewd" became "lascivious" became "prurient." There is a
semantic phenomenon at work, and it is worthy of analysis. Some
have suggested that when the standard of prohibition comes into too
common usage it is no longer an effective standard. When someone
could describe a piece of furniture that he found distasteful as being
"obscene," the courts had to find a new password for the fraternity
of censors to apply in their work. If this suggestion is valid, then
"prurient" may have a limited life expectancy as well. In any event,
4. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5. The author gave short shrift to the puzzlement of C. Herman Pritchett who
co=ented on the case in CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 41 (1954). Pritchett
foresaw difficulty because of this ambiguity, but to the author the case was clear.
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since so much allegedly turns on the particular words used, the
phenomenon is worthy of further analysis.
Some day a lawyer-sociologist-psychiatrist-semanticist will write a
book explaining why motion picture censorship is such a pervasive
notion. In writing such a book that hybrid author will certainly find
Mr. Carmen's book most useful. Until it is written Mr. Carmen's
book will at least tell the reader how motion picture censorship
works, which is a lot more than can be derived from reading either
the court decisions or the legal commentaries about those decisions.
Abner]. Mikva,
Member of the Illinois Bar

